TERRITORIAL PLANNING AND LA PLATA BASIN BORDERS

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MIGRATORY DYNAMICS AND TRANSBORDERING IN LA PLATA BASIN: AN OUTLOOK AT THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF HAITIANS AND SENEGALESES

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ABSTRACT

With the saturation of models for the reception and integration of immigrants in the Northern Hemisphere, namely in the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, and the consequent migration and refugee crises, La Plata Basin has presented itself as an alternative to several new groups, among them, the Haitians and Senegalese, those of greater expression — according to the official statistics and estimates of contemporary studies. In this sense, this chapter analyses the dynamics of these two specific groups, considered transnational immigrants by contemporary literature, and their repercussions in the transbordering regions of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It also identifies the immigration booms on these countries in the period from 2010 to 2016, as well as the occurrence of cycles of arrival, settlement and remigration within the macro-regional context. Finally, using the instruments of thematic mapping and statistical analysis of migration, the text is concluded with a description of the profile of trans and international migrations in La Plata Basin, their relations with the borderlands and their perspectives regarding the political, economic and social changes during this transition period including demographic and regional disruption.

KEYWORDS International migrations, migratory dynamics, La Plata Basin.

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INTRODUCTION

The process herein approached started with the collapse of the reception and integration models of immigrants and refugees in traditional receiving countries from Northern Hemisphere, for example, United Kingdom, United States of America and member countries of the European Union – in particular France, Spain and Hungary. At the end of the decade 2010, there were new alternatives to the potential immigrants, among them, Brazil, strong at that period. Therefore, after the cyclical crisis, they reached this regional power and the nations of La Plata Basin and Latin America as well. This chapter begins with the brief narrative above, in order to justify the “new migrations” directed to Brazil; those increased between 2010-2014, according to Uebel (2017), and between 2014 and 2016 in the other states of La Plata Basin: Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. These new migrations had a background built by economic, political, social and conjectural motivations; thus reshaping the border dynamics and practices in this peculiar region of Latin America.

Then, the hypothesis which we will discuss along this chapter is that the increase of migratory flow directed to the region of La Plata Basin occurred due to repulsive conjunctural factors in the Northern Hemisphere combined with a coincident economic, labor and social dynamism in Latin America and La Plata Basin, these were attractive to immigrants and alternative to the traditional receiving countries. In addition, the bankruptcy of the Brazilian model of integration and accommodation of these immigrants lead to remigrations to the Platine neighbors and other countries.

However, our analysis will point out that, in spite of the reconfiguration of the borders and the transbordering economy, recurring practices of the Northern Hemisphere, such as xenophobia, regional-nationalism and aversion to immigrants – mainly the ones of black ethnic origin – we will find reverberation and acceptance in Platine receiving societies; thereafter, this critical alert is important before we proceed the discussions of the chapter.

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1 According to the understanding of the Organization of American States and the Treaty of the River Plata Basin (BRAZIL, 1970), we consider Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay as Participating States of La Plata Basin, since they are bathed by the rivers that are part of this basin: Paraná, Paraguay and Uruguay. In geographic literature there is no consensus on the insertion of Bolivia as a political actor in this regionalization; however, Bolivia’s presence is essential for fully understanding migratory and remigratory dynamics.
The choice of two singular groups – Haitians and Senegalese – among the dozens of “new groups” that migrate en masse (Baeninger, 2015) to La Plata Basin between the years 2010-2016 arises from two factors: 1) geo-cultural representation of these origin regions: Caribbean and African west coast; 2) perception and transbordering promotion in the Platine context, previously only performed by the national groups of this own region, without outsiders.

However, these are not the nationalities highlighted in the migratory statistics rankings in the countries of La Plata Basin – Haitians represent around 2 % of the total immigrants, while Senegalese less than 0,3 % – their intensity and praxis call our attention in this analysis, in addition its migratory uniqueness to this region.

Vania Herédia (2015) points out, for example, that Senegalese’s migration to Latin America occurred only in two moments, the first during the Portuguese-Spanish slavery period, between XVI and XIV centuries, and the second moment only in the second decade of XXI, in other words, forced migration and now economic migrants or refuge migrations. Furthermore, as already mentioned, these two groups represent also, excepted all social, cultural and national particularities, the immigration dynamics of other Caribbean and African west coast nationals. According to official statistics, they represent a substantial percentage (around 20 to 30 %), depending on each La Plata Basin states.

Brazil, for example, stands out in Haitian immigration, around 56,000 immigrants – economics and humanitarian visa holders –, meanwhile Argentina leads the Senegalese ranking, with almost 6,000 immigrants, both in the same period, from 2010 to 2016. After these initial considerations that will be deepened along the chapter, it is important to discuss briefly about its division, as well as the methodological and quantitative issues – of data – that permeated the conduction of the research, which started simultaneously with the migratory boom in 2014².

The structure of the text is divided in four sections, besides this Introduction and the Final Considerations, as well as the References used, in the end of the text. We intend to divide the analysis to provide didactic understanding of the processes and dynamics occurred with the Haitians and Senegalese migration in

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² Chapter resulting of the project “Transbordering in South America: territorial dynamics, regional development, integration and defense on the southern and the northern borders of Brazil”, financed by Pro-Defense Fellowship of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense in cooperation with Coordination of Improvement of Higher Level Personnel. The author is grateful for public funding, derived from taxes paid by Brazilian taxpayers, responsible for the Brazilian scientific development.
this proposed time frame, i.e., between 2010 – beginning of these migrations – and 2016, last year with complete available data.

Thereby, the first section “La Plata Basin Migrations: General Aspects” is divided in five sequential subsections, in which we will analyze briefly, around one page, the migratory profile of each five Platine countries, in order to provide as a background the analysis and the understanding of the following sections. In these subsections, we will prioritize the use of graphics and an introductory thematic cartography, to help the localization of the reader.

The second section titled “Haitian Migration in La Plata Basin” is dedicated to Haitian migratory processes in this region, as economic immigrants holders of Caribbean praxis, different from those verified so far in this geography dominated basically by intra-regional migrations of Mercosurean and Andean citizens.

The third section “Senegalese Immigration in La Plata Basin” uses both thematic cartography and demographic data analysis. In addition, it will point out the dynamics and the directions given by the quick Senegalese immigration – composed by economic migrants and (here a surprise) refugees – representatives of one highly dynamic region in the African continent, its west coast.

The last section encompasses the results of this research, under a critical-internationalist perspective, entitled “Borders, Political, Economic and Social Changes”. This section will identify and discuss resignification of borders in the Platine scope, as well as the political, economic, social and labor changes that lead Haitian and Senegalese remigration inside this region, and also to third parts, such as the United States and Canada, in the Northern Hemisphere.

Before we proceed the discussions of the chapter, it is necessary a brief digression about the concepts used in the text, as well as the acquisition and the use of the statistical data that support our analysis. Following the discussion models already performed by Oliveira (2012) and Garcia (2016), we prioritized a critical, descriptive and intuitive analysis (to the reader) of the identified phenomena, linking and inserting it in the political and economic conjuncture at the time of the analyzed facts.

In this way, the chapter uses the concepts of immigrant and economic immigration from Rocha-Trindade (1995) and of refugee from Moreira (2014). Therefore, in this analysis some categories are not considered such as political
and environmental refugees, expatriates, temporary or provisional migrants, dual citizenship individuals and tourists with permanent visa.

In relation to the used data³, their obtainment translates the conduction of an imagined regional integration in La Plata Basin: bureaucratic, difficult and restrictive/excluding. The Brazilian data were obtained from Uebel’s (2015) research and were updated through a request performed based on the Law of Access to Information to the Federal Police and Ministry of Justice.

The data from Argentina were obtained from National Direction of Migration (DNM, in Spanish), associated to the Ministry of the Interior, Public Works and Housing, the radicaciones are counted by this organ. In relation to data from the neighbor Uruguay, these were obtained from two different organs: National Direction of Migration (DNM, in Spanish), belonging to Interior Ministry and National Institute of Statistics (INE, in Spanish).

The data from Paraguay, accessed in a complete and fast way in comparison to the other countries, were obtained through the Law of Access to Information from that country, with National Direction of Migration of Interior Ministry. Lastly, the more peculiar and long obtainment of statistics occurred with Bolivia, whose form was in a more formal way – submission of a registered correspondence to the General Direction of Migration – the document with the answer took almost two months to be received by the researcher, evidencing the research difficulties when we venture out in the Latin America interrelated analysis.

We expect with this discussion to advance in the understanding of migratory dynamics, transbordering, economic and social, in the context of La Plata Basin, one of the regions that, according to Carneiro Filho (2016), had an economic great expansion and political visibility – in spite of crises, coups, breaks and impeachments – in the Southern Hemisphere along the last two decades, and still remains a great laboratory to be explored by Geographers, Economists, Internationalists and Political Scientists, in the light of the comprehension of the Planet and the third millennium. After all, this region of the world is a mirror to the praxis of other nations (Prado; Pellegrino, 2014).

³ All the original statistical tables, as well as the documents and forms used to obtain the data, are available for consultation at this link: <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/pt6hby8wgawhj9f/AABmp011pe0jkCLHlmxfUCoba?dl=0>. 
LA PLATA BASIN MIGRATIONS: GENERAL ASPECTS

In this section we will briefly analyze the general aspects and the international migrations panorama in the five States of La Plata Basin. This part of the text is relevant since it provides the background for the understanding of the Haitian and Senegalese migratory dynamics that will be discussed in the following two sections.

In this regard, it is highlighted that the compilation of the migratory quantitative data in the American system has been receiving special emphasis in the last years, with distinction to the studies performed by the international organizations such as Organization of American States (2015), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Pizarro; Rivera, 2016), International Migration Commission (2012) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012), evidencing the institutional engagement in these issues of regional and territorial integration in the context of La Plata Basin and, consequently, focused on the migrations.

In relation to the international migrations variation in these five countries, graphic 1 below points out the verified trends, influenced by its own cyclic dynamic on screen:

These data – that do not contemplate migrant stock of each country, with this methodological caveat –, indicate, therefore, the high grade of remigration meantime in La Plata Basin, with Brazil being the initial attraction pole to Caribbeans and Africans, Argentina and Paraguay the intermediate poles (or secondary), Bolivia and Uruguay, the transitory alternative destinations (DAT, in Portuguese), and we will discuss in each subsection, by country.
ANNUAL ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANTS IN PLATA BASIN COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>174,645</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>52,944</td>
<td>177,731</td>
<td>2,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>126,864</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>73,626</td>
<td>105,119</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>162,403</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>97,533</td>
<td>34,482</td>
<td>2,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>137,515</td>
<td>3,794</td>
<td>105,823</td>
<td>118,060</td>
<td>3,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>92,064</td>
<td>10,151</td>
<td>115,624</td>
<td>82,171</td>
<td>3,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>127,678</td>
<td>6,016</td>
<td>113,705</td>
<td>342,908</td>
<td>1,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>215,139</td>
<td>5,099</td>
<td>51,916</td>
<td>438,034</td>
<td>3,182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graphic 1. Annual entrance in La Plata Basin countries.
Source: Data collected by the author using quantitative information obtained from the following organs: Dirección Nacional de Migraciones (Argentina), Dirección General de Migración (Bolivia), Departamento de Policía Federal (Brazil), Dirección General de Migraciones (Paraguay), Dirección Nacional de Migración (Uruguay), Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Uruguay), Sistema Continuo de Reportes sobre Migración Internacional en las Américas (OAS) and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

ARGENTINA

In spite of immigratory booms experienced both by Brazil and Paraguay in the analyzed period (2010-2016), Argentina, the second largest Platine economy, observed an increase in its immigratory flows after 2014, according to Graphic 2:
According to data collected by *Sistema Continuo de Reportes sobre Migración Internacional en las Américas*, from the American States Organization, the immigrant population in Argentina corresponds to about 4.5% of the total population of the country, a high index for Latin American standards (Castillo; Gurrieri, 2012) and similar to the European Union countries (Domenech, 2007). Between 2010 and 2016, the analysis period, Argentina received 1.03 million of economic immigrants.

In November 2006, OIM director, Brunson McKinley, recognized the modernizer and innovative aspect of the new Argentinean migratory law “Great Nation” as “world example” (INFOBAE, 2006). This law is one of the most modern and receptive to immigrants in the Southern Hemisphere context – instead of the new restrictive alterations imposed by Mauricio Macri administration in 2017 (Clarín, 2017) –, thus allowing the compliance of the immigratory main groups diversity in that country (Table 1):

![Graphic 2. Immigrant Annual Entrance in Argentina.](source)

*Source: Data collected by the author using quantitative information obtained from Dirección Nacional de Migraciones.*
### Table 1
Immigrant entrance in Argentina by nationality 2011/2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguayan</td>
<td>54,775</td>
<td>66,583</td>
<td>54,615</td>
<td>33,845</td>
<td>46,008</td>
<td>255,826</td>
<td>39.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian</td>
<td>31,471</td>
<td>42,008</td>
<td>33,454</td>
<td>20,251</td>
<td>27,964</td>
<td>155,148</td>
<td>24.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peruvian</td>
<td>20,734</td>
<td>28,057</td>
<td>19,243</td>
<td>10,857</td>
<td>13,829</td>
<td>92,720</td>
<td>14.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>7,568</td>
<td>12,354</td>
<td>12,628</td>
<td>6,218</td>
<td>12,406</td>
<td>51,174</td>
<td>7.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilean</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>3,024</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>2,864</td>
<td>13,576</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguayan</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>2,199</td>
<td>2,429</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>10,633</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuelan</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>4,707</td>
<td>9,920</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuadorian</td>
<td>1,336</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>1,564</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>8,011</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>2,216</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>5,609</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>4,354</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegalese</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>4,259</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>4,102</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>2,517</td>
<td>3,323</td>
<td>10,472</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Temporary</strong></td>
<td><strong>126,864</strong></td>
<td><strong>162,403</strong></td>
<td><strong>137,515</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,064</strong></td>
<td><strong>127,678</strong></td>
<td><strong>646,524</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguayan</td>
<td>57,034</td>
<td>56,635</td>
<td>62,972</td>
<td>45,164</td>
<td>58,225</td>
<td>280,030</td>
<td>39.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian</td>
<td>36,331</td>
<td>31,963</td>
<td>34,083</td>
<td>26,889</td>
<td>31,996</td>
<td>161,262</td>
<td>24.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peruvian</td>
<td>17,284</td>
<td>17,909</td>
<td>20,070</td>
<td>15,405</td>
<td>16,074</td>
<td>86,742</td>
<td>14.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>2,733</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>4,614</td>
<td>4,020</td>
<td>8,496</td>
<td>22,899</td>
<td>7.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>4,260</td>
<td>4,133</td>
<td>4,158</td>
<td>5,317</td>
<td>21,543</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguayan</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>10,606</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilean</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>10,188</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,662</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>7,425</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another issue that deserves emphasis, in this brief compilation about the international migrations panorama to Argentina, is the entrance points of these immigrants, that occur mostly through land borders of the country with Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, exactly their Platine neighbors.

According to the document *Panorama Movimientos Migratorios*, from National Migration Direction (Argentina, 2016), approximately 80 % of the immigratory flows in Argentina occur mostly through land borders with the other La Plata Basin countries.

In this way, it is different when comparing to Brazil, which had the land borders reconfigured since the dynamism of international migration; Argentina observed an enhancement of the migration networks and immigrants and refugees services in its land border posts, according to Caggiano (2003).

We highlight, finally, the physical and institutional infrastructure in Argentina that may serve as a model to the other Platine countries in the migratory issue, whereas it accommodates, as seen above, a multicultural and diverse immigrant stock, modern legislations, qualified border apparatus and transbordering practices.
reported in its own culture and macro-regional economy (Mármora, 2016). A huge contrast will be found in the following subsection, with the analysis of immigratory reality in Bolivia.

**BOLIVIA**

The Plurinational State of Bolivia, together with Uruguay, is one of the transitory alternative destinations, or DAT (in Portuguese), as was mentioned before, i.e., this country is not the main destination or option to the international migrants in the twenty-first century; however, this country is an alternative transitory territory, arisen through the reimmigration experiences of its neighbors, in particular Brazil and Argentina.

In comparison with the other five Platine states, Bolivia is the one which shows the second low immigratory flow in the period from 2010 to 2016, according to the Graphic 3, only behind Uruguay.

Graphic 3 shows, therefore, a total number of 28,000 temporary and permanent immigrants in this period of 6 years, irrelevant to the Latin American context, but pertinent when analyzing the groups that compose it.

![Graphic 3. Annual entrance of immigrants in Bolivia. Source: Data compiled by the author from quantitative information obtained from Dirección General de Migración (Bolivia).](image-url)
The Organization of American States (2015) indicates that Bolivia immigration varied between 18-27 thousand individuals from 2010 until 2012, reaching 22 thousand in 2013 with constant growth. More than 50% of temporary immigration is due to international agreements, essentially Mercosur.

Another Bolivia’s singularity factor in Platine scope is its role as transit territory to Caribbean, Asiatic and Africans enhanced flows to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay (Mamed, 2016) – the latter still keeps that feature in a lesser degree. Nevertheless, Evo Morales’ populist government (Carrizo, 2009) acted in favor of migratory legislation reformulation aiming migrations (even transitory) rule in country economy.

According to OAS (2015), financial remittances represent about 5 % of Bolivian Gross Domestic Product. For example, in 2013, Bolivia received 1.18 billion dollars in migrant remittances what represents an increase of 8 % in comparison to the previous year, overcoming other Platine countries (Fajnzylber; Lopez, 2008).

Since 2012, new Bolivian migration and refuge law privileges migrants protection (economic and refugee) in its articles highlighting the following rights: family reunification, municipal elections participation, worship and religious freedom, interpreter support – in addition to recognizing politic manifestation and immigrant associations and migration motivated by climatic changes, previously unheard of throughout America – which had favored Haitian and Senegalese flows at this country.

Despite jurisprudential innovations, Bolivia is the La Plata Basin country with the lowest human development index, counting on economic, social, political and institutional severe infrastructure deficiencies – reflected in difficulty to collecting data, as mentioned before.

In spite of underdevelopment remnants, this Andean country role is more than an economic or legal migration forum (permanent, temporary or transitional), it is also logistic – according to field research at the country between 2014 August and 2015 May – due to its condition of main provider of “new groups” towards Brazil, as seen in Figure 1 (next page).

It is important to emphasize that Bolivia has a large number of nationals – or expatriates according to current literature (BERRY; BELL, 2011) – inside other La Plata Basin countries, since Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay receive
immigrants, refugees and serve as political asylum – because of political instability and economic and social underdevelopment of this multicultural and multiethnic country.

BRAZIL

Among five Platine countries, Brazil has the greatest territorial extension, population, Gross Domestic Product and particularities – plus crisis – related to two decades of a real giant, a regional power.

Constituted, since the sixteenth century, of varied ethnicities, nationalities and people, by means of migration (forced – slavery, economic and refugee of two Great Wars and due to hunger), Brazil and its society are defined as multicultural;
definition followed by increase (double) immigratory flow between 2010-2014 and declining due to the biggest economic and political crisis occurred in 2015 culminating in a democratic break in 2016 (Jinkings; Doria; Cleto, 2016) with the irregular dismissal of president, economist and ex-guerrilla Dilma Rousseff.

Graphic 4 clearly shows another break in migratory flow in 2016, that fell by half when compared to the preceding year. However, Brazil was the biggest receiver of southern hemisphere immigrants since 2007 (UEBEL, 2015).

Regarding transnational migration insertion to Brazil in La Plata Basin context, it is impossible to forget the reconfiguration – or resignification – of South, Midwest and North regions border lands, which became mainly front door to Caribbeans, Africans, Asians, and even Andean and Mercosurean migratory flows, traditional migrants since the eighteenth century.

If, in the past, migrations to Brazil occurred mainly by sea, Germans, Italians and Japanese cases during the nineteenth century or by air such as Palestinians, Syrians and Afghans cases in the twenty-first century, now re the roads – sometimes unpaved – that drive Haitians, Senegalese, Bengali, Malaysians and other groups towards the South and Southeast regions of the country, as well as their dreams and motivations.
Rückert, Carneiro Filho and Uebel (2016) point that the migratory boom occurrence in Brazil is due to its economic increase attached to active and haughty foreign policy (Amorim, 2015) and a mostly receptive migratory agenda than other regional powers like Canada and Australia, for example, and not so excluding like the United Kingdom, the United States and European Union members.

The following map (Figure 2) represents the origin of immigratory groups who chose Brazil for its apparent economic, labor, social and, if not, political welfare:

![Figure 2. Immigrant quota in Brazil according to country of origin – 2007/2015. Source: Compiled by the author.](image)

Previous cartographic illustration shows that more than two hundred nationalities migrated to Brazil in a short period – when compared with the past great “migratory waves” as pointed by Piore (1979). Literature often refers to these mass migrations as a reflection of Brazil’s projection in the international system, a legitimate global player on the migration agenda previously restricted to great economic powers.

However, after Dilma Rousseff’s reelection political crisis from October 2014 – simultaneously with Migration Nation Strategy by means of the 1st National
Conference about Migration and Refuge – and with its peak in 2016 with final dismissal that reverberated in a crisis cycle: political, economic, labor and social migratory crisis.

Unemployment rate in Brazil jumped from 6.7 % in 2010 – less than the majority of the European bloc – to 8.4 % in 2015, 11.5 % in 2016 and 13.7 % in the first quarter of 2017 with direct impacts in migrants layoffs following logics pointed out by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): “The first to be dismissed are irregular immigrants”, states José Salazar, economist at ILO. Jean-Christophe Dumont, economist at OECD, reinforces this statement. (Netto; Chade, 2009).

If in the past Brazil was considered an Eldorado (Silva; Assis, 2016), from 2015 it has become a nightmare to immigrants and their relatives who bet their life savings and mental and physical efforts to cross continents looking for an opportunity of better life and social security, leading to remigration phenomenon.

Remigration, the immigration of an established immigrant from one country to another one than his birthplace – not to be confused with, as has happened to Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, mostly next Platine neighbors and with good economic and employability indexes in alternative to the far Canada and the traditional United States.

During unusual Michel Temer’s administration – then Dilma Rousseff’s vice president and running mate in 2010 and 2014 – a new migration law was approved. Law No. 13.445 from May 24 of 2017 replaced the Foreign Statute (dating from dictatorial period), outdated and not commensurate with the migratory (and democratic) reality of the country.

Despite the efforts and advances made by the new Migration Law, important articles were vetoed by the president of the Republic, with a lower popularity than the unemployment rate, in light of the political and economic irony that prevails in the country, despite a risky “threat to the sovereignty and national security” with the arrival of foreigners, in the presidential words in veto of said law, demonstrating total ignorance of the new immigration reality of Brazil: a country of emigrants and remigrants, and with an immigrant stock representing about 0.9 % of its total population, impacting directly on the other Platine states, as will be discussed.

PARAGUAY

Paraguay draws attention of International Relations analysts, geographers and economists at the beginning of this century due to its political, economic and territorial dynamization compared to other Platine and Latin American countries.

Being a stable democracy – despite the legislative coup that deposed Fernando Lugo in 2012 (Bèle, 2012; Morin, 2012) – and maintaining greater economic growth, employability and human development indexes than Brazil, Paraguay stands as the most immigrant friendly country in La Plata Basin between 2010 and 2016 according to the following Graphic. Paraguay received about 1.3 million immigrants:

Graphic 5. Annual entrance of immigrants in Paraguay.
Source: Data compiled by the author from quantitative information obtained from Dirección General de Migraciones of Paraguay.

Together with Argentina, Paraguay is a secondary destination of international migrations (remigrations in this case) after the first boom experienced by Brazil in 2010. Official data obtained from Dirección General de Migraciones of Paraguay surely indicate the occurrence of two subsequent booms in Paraguay in the years 2015 and 2016.
According to Oddone et al. (2011), hypothesis with which we agree, Paraguay absorbed not only Haitian and Senegalese remigrations but also a great flow of Bolivian, Taiwanese (without diplomatic relations with communist China), Syrians, Palestinians and lately Venezuelan refugees from Nicolas Maduro’s dictatorship (Correia, 2016; Pintos, 2017).

For a long time, Paraguay used to be a traditional sender of migrants to Brazil, United States and Spain, but for the first time since its colonization that perceived before.

In relation to the Paraguayan territory, we also emphasize its strategic importance in the South American outline, as a “border” between Mercosurean and Andean nations. As we will see in the cartographies of the next sections, the flows of Senegalese and Haitians passed largely through Paraguay and its borders with Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina.

Public policy turned to immigrants and displaced people (forced and politics) has served equally as referential to other neighboring nations in Mercosur scope. For example, Paraguay government has had an active voice in public discussions and working groups pertinent to the subject.

The establishment of a National Refugee Commission (CONARE) and bilateral transbordering partnerships in the care of displaced migrants, including their own nationals, has been reflected in the reduction of two illegal acts traditionally found in La Plata Basin: smuggling and human trafficking. The Paraguayan-Brazilian border, in the cities of Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil) (Figure 3) saw physical and human reinforcement at their checkpoints in the last decade.

Despite the reduction of these two practices, we will see in the sections dedicated to the analysis of the Senegalese and Haitian migrations that many coyotes of Paraguayan nationality intermediated these flows with direction to Brazil between 2010 and 2014, what ended up moving Paraguayan economy itself, irregularly and criminally, as it has soared from -1.2% in 2012 to 14% in 2013, for example.
Figure 3. Modernized migratory and customs control post on Paraguay-Brazil border – Ciudad del Este.
Photographia: Camilo Pereira Carneiro Filho.
It was a frequent phrase in ordinary conversation – mainly after economic crisis experienced by Argentina and Brazil: “I’m going to move to Uruguay”. Uruguay has a smaller territory and the third largest Latin American HDI, it is an alternative transitory destination to Platine international migrants. Uruguay received about 18 thousand immigrants as seen in Graphic 6 in six years – an irrelevant quota in comparison with similar nations in development and size such as Suriname itself in South America, or the lowercase Andorra in Europe.

Bengochea (2014) emphasizes that the small immigration flow within and towards Uruguay is justified more by a long-term lack in job opportunities and career building rather than by a hypothetical restriction of the country to international migrants, since this is one of the states with the largest number of expatriates in the world.

Uruguay has geostrategic importance in transbordering relations and mobility in La Plata Basin. Like Bolivia, it serves as transit territory to big flows between...
Brazil and Argentina and also as an alternative arrival port (mainly by sea) for Asian and African irregular migration – sometimes wrongly classified as clandestine or illegal –, since they travel in merchant ships often hidden or not registered (Arocena; Aguiar, 2007).

We will see in the next section that Uruguay has absorbed a considerable number of Haitians and Senegalese remigrated from Brazil or not accepted in Argentina, even more so after 2015, including its policy of welcoming forced and displaced migrants.

It is also worth noting the Uruguayan role in the reception and integration of the ex-prisoner migrants from the North American base of Guantanamo in Cuba, these of Arab-Muslim majority, that were received by Uruguay after its commitment with the United States (Correa, 2014), highlighting the humanitarian nature that Montevideo provides to the issues of human mobility.

Finally, the dynamization of the transnational borders of Brazil and Argentina with Uruguay, usually consolidated in squares, parks or small bridges, denotes the mobility character of Mercosurian citizens among these three Platine countries. Many of them with dual citizenship or even triple-identity, what characterizes in a very peculiar way the culture and economy of the state of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, the departments of Artigas and Rivera in Uruguay, and the provinces of Misiones, Corrientes and Entre Ríos, in Argentina, affecting the planning and territorial organization of these countries in a joint and structured way (Lemos, Rückert, 2014).

**HAITIAN IMMIGRATION IN LA PLATA BASIN**

Previously we briefly analyzed migratory profile of the five La Plata Basin states: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in order to build a background to understand two migratory “phenomena”, of Haitians and Senegalese, as well as their dynamics in the Platine context.

Haitian immigration both in Latin American and in La Plata Basin is not the main migratory flow when analyzing a historical series of each of the countries (Uebel, 2015). However, it has higher growth and proportional participation in a short time, from 2010 on, and different motivations of those traditional Europeans and Asians as well as intra-regional migrants.
This section is based in discussions of Pinto (2015), Baeninger et al. (2016) and Evangelista (2016) who studied Haitian immigration to the South American continent under different prisms as economic, demographic, sociologic, historic, political, legal and cultural approaches; whose authors are excellent references and extra sources of consultation to those interested in the theme.

As a result of primary data exploratory research, we perceived a larger agency of five Platine countries governmental institutions in attempt to understand this new immigrant context – bi and multilateral action issues as well as regional forums about Haitian immigration (Mercosur, 2012; Annoni; Manzi, 2016).

Literature consulted does not indicate a consensus about several issues in contemporary Haitian immigration, named as Haitian diaspora (Handerson, 2015) by some authors; however, we will discover for the main motivations and repercussions on interesting and challenging – in formulating agendas and public and territorial policies– contemporary immigratory flow.

Miranda and Junqueira (2015) argue that the political, economic and institutional situation in Haiti in the mid-2000s, after the decades of dictatorships of Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) and Jean-Bertrand Aristide – with seemingly democratic “interregnums” – were conducive to a national instability non-permissive to the full development of its inhabitants, be it educational, social, financial or cultural dimensions.

In the context of civil war that hit Haiti until 2004 and the subsequent installation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH) from June 2004 to April 2017, the population of that country was, for a decade, restricted to a territorial and political context with no chance of improvement or stabilization, although it presents satisfactory rates – for Caribbean standards – from basic to higher education and professional qualification.

Since UNSTAMIH installation in 2004 under Brazil mandate – a capillarization of Lula’s active and haughty external policy – until 2010 Haiti has experienced a period of national reconstruction: roads and streets, institutions, universities and country’s own democracy (the first post-coup presidential election occurred in 2006).

That relative stability and reconstruction – although slow and bureaucratic – of the Haitian state was interrupted in the afternoon of January 12, 2010 with the
greatest earthquake that has ever happened in Haitian history, reaching 7.0 Richter scale, whose epicenter was 25 km from the capital Port-au-Prince.

At the time of earthquake, the country was totally destroyed, killing about 316 thousand people and displacing another 1.5 million, more than 10 % of the country’s total population. In addition to the deaths of thousands of civilians and military members of UNSTAMIH, the earthquake killed Hedi Annabi, chief of the United Nations operation, as well as the Brazilian doctor Zilda Arns, international coordinator of Pastoral da Criança, and potential candidate for the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, causing great international commotion at the time.

This is a brief historical and contextual profile of Haiti, in order to have a starting point for the understanding of this migratory phenomenon destined to the so-called “Global South”, because, until then, Haitian migrations were driven mainly to four countries: the Dominican Republic, the United States, Canada and France, and even less to Belgium and Cuba.

Why migrate to Brazil? This was the main question raised after the mass arrival of Haitians in the country since 2012. Scholars, governments and activists were not able to give a consensual explanation. Even considering troubled and unclear motivations, the choice for Brazil raises further questions. In the scope of reasons that led the Haitians to emigrate – namely still without country choice when in decision-making process – Mejía and Simon (2015) found the following responses: the need for immediate employment; leaving a completely destroyed country with no prospect; seek a better opportunity for their family; fear of another natural disaster (there was still the Hurricane Matthew in October 2016); political persecution; performance of Brazilian armed forces was a good “propaganda” and attractiveness; etc.

Such motivations caused disorientation in researchers when first analyzing the Haitian immigration (still in 2010 and 2012), and had a even greater effect on these groups reception in Brazil (among 2012 and 2014) and other Platine countries from 2015. What was the classification of Haitians immigrants? Refugees, economic immigrants, asylum seekers, irregular immigrants?

Literature and even legal order find difficulties to define those immigrants since they come from a country plagued by natural disasters (environmental refugees), political disasters (asylum or political refugees), and economic disasters (economic
migrants). A solution pointed by Dilma Rousseff’s administration (subsequently replicated by Argentina and Uruguay) was granting a humanitarian visa – a legal and consular apparatus between refugee status and regular immigration, with subsequent authorization to Haitians to remain in Brazilian territory.

To illustrate Haitian immigration in the Platine context we present the main routes used by Haitians heading towards Brazil and to other La Plata Basin countries with the following map (Figure 4, next page).

It can be seen from the previous map that the routes used practically the entire South American territory, not to mention in this cartography, other routes used by Haitians in the North of the continent, through Venezuela and the three Guianas, entering Brazil by the states of Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá, but in a much lower degree and intensity (Handerson, 2015).

Bolivia, despite restrictions on the entry of Haitians, which is reflected in the country’s refusal to provide statistical data on this migration, as well as Paraguay and Uruguay, served as transit countries before the arrival at the destinations in Argentina and Brazil.

However, according to Table 2, transitionally also includes the fixation of Haitians in these countries, especially after the aggravation of 2015 Brazilian crisis:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1,618</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,824</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>5,611</td>
<td>10,691</td>
<td>14,533</td>
<td>20,626</td>
<td>56,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled data by author from Ibid.
Figure 4. Map of the routes used by Haitians heading towards Latin America/La Plata Basin.
Source: Author
The land borders between Brazil/Uruguay/Argentina and between Paraguay/Bolivia and Paraguay/Bolivia/Brazil were re-signified with the arrival in large contingents of almost 60,000 Haitians in the analyzed period, although Brazil is still the main country of destination.

Official information indicates that Bolivia has received about 1,824 Haitian immigrants between 2010 and 2016, but with only 29 permanent residence permits at the period, which characterizes the country as a transitory alternative destination, given its existing socioeconomic conditions, which are slightly superior and attractive considering those of Haiti itself, the sending country.

Furthermore, Argentina was the third country with the largest number of Haitian immigrants, many of these remigrants from Brazil after the beginning of 2014 crisis, reaching a contingent of almost 2,000 immigrants living in Greater Buenos Aires – which did not prevent episodes of xenophobia, for example (Lavaca, 2010).

Uruguay and Paraguay together received nearly 1,000 Haitians, mostly from the Brazilian states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, since they had been fired after the closure of industries in those regions; in those countries, Haitians are divided into two groups: a) those who seek new employment opportunities and attempt to stay; and b) those who are applying for asylum, refuge or immigrant visa at the US and Canadian embassies in Montevideo and Asunción.

In border regions, there were very interesting Haitians transnational praxis, such as religious, cultural and social traditions adapted from its origin, Haiti, with a dressing from the places where they initially settled in Brazil, such as the habit of drinking *chimarrão*; it is common to see in Rivera’s (Uruguay), La Plata’s (Argentina) or Asunción’s (Paraguay) streets, Haitians-gauchos, who have knowledge of the Portuguese language and tell stories lived in Brazil, now replicated in their Platine neighbors.

We also identified another dynamics emerged after Haitian migratory influx: the creation of common agendas and working groups among La Plata Basin countries, made up of armed and police forces, diplomats, universities, business associations and NGOs from five countries, in order to create a regional “semi-policy” in attention to Haitians, as noted by Giraldi (2013).

Although it is not one of the main migrations in La Plata Basin – the internal Mercosureans are still the main ones, followed by Portuguese, Spanish and North
Americans! – Haitian migration has boosted the borders, governments and societies of the countries to they migrated, seeking a reconstruction and restructuring, finding, however, scenarios opposite to their dreams and imagination, most of the time; and thus, demanding their own territorial reorganization and emergence of governmental adjustments.

**SENEGALESE IMMIGRATION IN LA PLATA BASIN**

If Haitian immigration in La Plata Basin was characterized by its intensity and transnational practices, we will see that Senegalese immigration, although numerically irrelevant – about 7,500 immigrants between 2010 and 2016 – has a highlight in its visibility and territorial repercussions that will be analyzed at this section.

Senegal is located on the west coast of the African continent (3,000 kilometers from the westernmost point of South America), and up to 7,000 kilometers from regions to which they migrated, separated by the giant Atlantic Ocean – historically linked by European colonialism, slavery and African-born cultures and religions that have won many supporters and admirers in the five Platine countries.

With a Human Development Index of 0.494 (considered underdeveloped) and a Gini coefficient of 40.3 (considered medium), Senegal is one of the most multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious nations in Africa, owning twelve national languages, among them French, a French colonialism remnant.

Despite indicators, Senegal is one of the most democratic states in Africa and, according to Freedom House (2012), the country never had a *coup d’état* in its history (a constant event in continent’s politics with dictatorial regimes existing until today, as in Zimbabwe, for example).

A stable democratic environment and a developing economy, even low, would theoretically provide fertile ground for country growth, its labor market and its institutions; but this is not the Senegal case.

Senegalese immigration has been intensified since 1960s towards Canada, France, Belgium and Italy, with its citizens migrating searching for better employment, education, social security and income opportunities. Predominantly Muslim religious, they did not find difficult to migrate towards other Muslim countries,
such as Morocco – a route point between Senegal and La Plata Basin – as well as Arab nations from Southeast Asia and Russia (Mateso, 2016).

Historiography stands out that Senegalese migration can be divided into different stages or “waves”, since Senegalese national state formation in 1960, but also before this existence, through forced slaves’ migration according to Santos (2010).

It is not an erroneous claim, therefore, that Argentinean, Brazilian, Uruguayan and Paraguayan societies possess in their genetic, ethnic and historical-cultural DNA Senegalese traits and genes. That is a long discussion that we will not approach, it is only a reminder of the origins of these Platine states – often placed in a purposive and political-racial manner as “European-South American” countries, fertilizing separatist sentiments in interim of their transnational borders.

Senegalese immigration can be defined as a mobility of opportunities, a term we coined after reading Heredia (2015) and Tedesco and Kleidermacher (2017), differently from Haitian immigration – fueled basically by catastrophic political, economic and environmental factors. Although the statistical records of Argentina and Brazil, mainly, carry requests for refuge and political asylum on the part of the Senegalese, it can be affirmed with precision that all migrants of this new generation post-2014 have exclusively economic motivation.

However, La Plata Basin was not first the alternative for this group, taking into account long distances between origin and destination point, as well as high transportation and accommodation costs during the migratory transit, always carried out by air between the continents, and air and land in South America interior, as shown in map of Figure 5.

As it was seen in the previous map, South America and La Plata Basin (more specifically) were not destinations that appeared at the top of the Senegalese’s priorities to emigrate. On the contrary, very little was known about these countries except its tradition in football, soap operas and the holding of 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil. It was precisely this sporting event and image created by soap operas what placed Brazil and Argentina on the route of contemporary Senegalese immigration.

With increasingly restrictive migration and border control policies in the European Union, that faces Sudanese, Somalis and Libyans mass flows, besides quotas imposed annually by Canada, Senegalese have been inserted into a paradox already studied by Rocha-Trindade (1995): where to migrate?
However, South American scenarios seemed to converge with Senegalese’s yearnings for a market to their goods and a job for their professional skills – Uebel (2015) has identified that most of them have a college degree and proficiency in at least two languages – 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil seemed to be the great opportunity to regularly migrate – albeit temporarily – to the South American giant.

As a policy of Dilma Rousseff’s government to facilitate tourists’ entry at the 2013 Confederations Cup, visa exemption for all nationalities was a facilitating point in decision to migrate to an alternative beyond the European Union and Canada. Argentina, in the same way, also facilitated the transit of tourists: why not extend the tour from Rio de Janeiro to Bariloche?

Such visa-free policies were in fact decisive for a great influx of not only Senegalese but also Ghanaians, who did not travel exclusively to accompany their football teams but also to risk a new life in countries they considered safe, stable and receptive, a thought that proved to be a mistake years later.
Table 3 translates these quotas into:

Table 3

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<tbody>
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<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>5,475</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data compiled by author from Ibid.

Contrary to media coverage given by the Brazilian press, which reached the point of announcing daily arrivals of Senegalese people in the bus stations of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Correio do Povo, 2015), it was not Brazil that received the highest number of immigrants, but Argentina – almost 5 thousand individuals and their families in six years, five times more than their neighbors.

Furthermore, these numbers demystify another consensus issue among Brazilian researchers: new Senegalese immigration was first driven to Bolivia in 2012, later to Argentina in 2013. Only in 2014 Brazil begin to register a large migration boom. Not just intriguing but equally revealing, such numbers were obtained from official organs of Platine countries.

Paraguay and its 81 Senegalese in six years is irrelevant in numerical question, only a transit territory among great migratory dynamics of Bolivia/Argentina/Brazil; Uruguay is not prominent – because it has received Senegalese remigrants both from Brazil and Argentina in recent years, or those who have not achieved refugee status in both countries.

In addition, when temporary visas granted by Buenos Aires and Brasília were overdue, many Senegalese had their regular condition turned into irregularity, deportations and loss of their jobs, which led to two movements: a) the request for refuge, denied almost immediately, because there is no evidence of serious violations of human rights in Senegal, as well as political persecution; b) permanent residence request or remigration between Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, increasing tourist visas terms, thus their permanence conditions.
As numbers show, this strategy did not work in Bolivia, with somewhat restrictive migratory policies, coupled with an unattractive or permissive scenario for Senegalese stay in Santa Cruz de La Sierra and La Paz regions; however, in Argentina a national policy (at the end of populist Cristina Kirchner’s government) allowed its regularization and state attention.

With the worsening of the crisis in Brazil, about 80% of Senegalese formal employees were dismissed, thus adding a large contingent of informal workers, selling goods from smuggling – see the transnational and transbordering relations of the logic of migrant capital – on the streets of the big cities of South and Southeastern Brazil, as well as on the coast of great part of the country, from Rio Grande to Guarujá.

In this sense, Brazil saw a drastic reduction in Senegalese immigration between 2015 and 2016, unlike Argentina, which has had a steady flow since the 2013 boom, with no downward trends. This transformation is noticeable in the borders of the two countries, especially in Uruguaiana/Paso de Los Libres and Foz do Iguaçu/Puerto Iguazú, if before the flow was from Argentina to Brazil, now it is the opposite, with different expectations as well.

This re-dynamization of Senegalese immigration is a unique event in Platine history: a fast, intense, flashy (at least on the part of media) flow and constantly changing in a short time, (less than a decade).

At the end of this chapter, we also highlight the perverse part of this immigration, pointed by so many nuances and territorial dynamics: xenophobia, walls and barriers construction, and the hatred and aversion found by these migrants in the five La Plata Basin countries discourses, and the inexistence of pari passu policies like the Haitian ones by government bodies.

Valluy (2008, 2016) places this as a political choice inserted in a governmental xenophobia context. However, intercontinental territory and intra-regional flows have experienced a rich facet of Afro-American cultural dynamism, as well as equally rich experiences for small communities that welcomed these immigrants, contrasting aforementioned perversities. This is an intrinsic and core character of Migrations Geography, as described by Mabogunje (1970).
BORDERS, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES

In the two previous sections we have seen that the migrations of Haitians and Senegalese to La Plata Basin included several new dynamics and the reconfiguration of borders, policies and state actions. While on the one hand they have been positive about the modernization of these processes, we will now see that the political, economic, and social changes that occurred throughout the decade in our five countries have brought negative repercussions, such as xenophobic and separatist discourses, or revived nationalism, regionalism and regional anti-integration sentiments.

Not only the Platine countries, but also practically all Latin America, with exception of Venezuela, lived a decade of great economic, social, political and democratic advances (in Brazil, until the 2016 democratic breakdown). Latin Americans have never traveled, consumed, studied, and learned so much, despite all the socio-economic inequalities that still exist.

Even information access, means of consumption and the products of globalization (Santos, 2008) have been increasing, we are not able to affirm, however, that moral and ethical progress has coincided – especially regarding global humanitarian issues.

Although diverse ethnic groups, cultures, constitute Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, nationalist and separatist sentiments have grown vigorously in the last decade, precisely due to an easier and increased access to information.

Regarding separatism itself, there are elements in different stages of structuring, especially in southern Brazil, as well as in Santa Cruz department in Bolivia, and Wallmapu Mapuche in Argentina, all with different motivations, but a common ideal: the separataion of the state.

Within separatist discourses, it is possible to find issues primarily linked to borders and, in a lesser extent, to migrations. Such movements would not be possible without border and territorial limits insertion in their speeches – although there is no unanimity on demarcations and border controls in the three groups mentioned. If we ask a member of Sul é meu país (Brazil), Juvenile Crucenista Union (Bolivia) or Consejo de Todas las Tierras (Argentina/Chile), surely they would not be able to say what imagined, official and possible State borders are.

Furthermore, people mobility (and migration) is a taboo subject for planners and urbanists of separatist movements. After all, a state needs individuals to
exist, as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau taught us. But what is the desirable kind of people to enter these States? Their former countrymen? European, indigenous, African immigrants? There is no answer, or at least, it is not registered in separatist movements, precisely because an idealized response would compromise the proper adhesion of new members to such movements: governmental xenophobia.

However, we do not need an intra-state separatist apparatus to identify actors and movements with aversion to immigrants’ discourses – or foreign, illegal, clandestine – in La Plata Basin context, many politicians, from local to senators, were in charge of uttering words against Haitians, Senegalese, Syrians and Venezuelans.

In the Brazilian case, we have seen a flood of xenophobic actions and speeches in recent years, starting with a city councilman from the Brazilian city of Caxias do Sul – that received small groups of Senegalese and Haitians – as follows:

I did not like these guys coming here. They are bringing no benefits to Brazil at all. They came to bring more poverty. So I’m not in favor of these guys here, not at all. People here need a lot of support too and they do not have it. (G1 RS, 2014).

However, the xenophobic discourse was not restricted to city councilmen. Republic senators such as Romero Jucá, one of leaders of the government of Michel Temer in Brazilian Senate, emphatically expressed that Brazil should not welcome Venezuelan refugees, and presented some ignorance about country migratory reality:

I defended and continue to defend denial of refuge requests [...] Refuge is okay to Haiti people, where there was an earthquake, calamity and the plague has raged, or because of war like Libya, people are killing each other there, bursting bombs on boys’ heads, this is a problem for refuge, [in Venezuela] it’s a matter of dictatorship, of political quarrel, so I defend that requests are not approved. [...] It is very easy for Maduro to send five million people to Brazil because we are going to pay the bill here and he gets rid of the problem. (Mello, 2017).

Furthermore, political discourse—which found similar xenophobic reverberations in Argentina during the review of immigration legislation by the government of Mauricio Macri (Page 12, 2017) – media has also presented a contrary view to
migrations, as can be seen in the headline of one of the main Brazilian monthly magazines: “Brazilian growth absorbs Haiti’s poor, for now” (Revista Veja, 2012).

Another mechanism that has been potent in the publication of opinions and demonstration of aversion to new immigrants in La Plata Basin is social networks, which have no boundaries and are precisely influenced by political, economic and social changes of the region in the last two decades.

If in the 1820s a newspaper took a month to register a fact involving the arrival of a family of German, Italian or Spanish immigrants – when it registered – in the ports of Buenos Aires, Montevideo or São Leopoldo, at present the arrival of a Haitian in the bus station of Porto Alegre or a Senegalese couple in Buenos Aires’ Buquebus is immediately published not only by the online pages of the newspapers, but they are also photographed and “denounced” on Twitter, Instagram and Facebook before they even reach their shelters or homes.

What motivations lead to mediatization and resumption of “foreigner” aversion in nations that have been rightly built by European, African, Asian, and indigenous energy and labour?

Cordova (2017) responds that a re-signification of nationalism, faced with globalization imposition as a way of life and production in late 1980s, allied with Latin America redemocratization and events of “world disintegration” such as Brexit, populist Trump’s conservatism, Le Pen et al., and the resurgence – as if they had ever disappeared – of white, Nazi, nationalist, ultra-rightist, and ultra-leftist supremacist ideologies were a lever for these aversion and hatred discourses, both in social networks as in real life.

The dynamization of the world, political freedom, re-signification of territories role, and expansion of information access, unfiltered and unchecked, have often allowed everybody to expose their opinions, dreams and desires in an aggressive, immediate, amoral and, in particular, anti-democratic way as in many reported cases.

Staudt (2017) argues that this is perhaps the way of a redefinition of the planet, of the nations and their borders, in stark contrast to what had been planned by a set of nations at the end of the Cold War. This new rationality, therefore, would allow descendants of immigrants to freely express their discontent and aversion to immigration to their cities, states and countries, without any remorse or feeling of
obligation towards other immigrants, since everything had been reconfigured or “deconstructed.”

We cannot say whether this will be the standard of humankind, whether in the confines of Mongolia or the triple Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina border, or in the Mediterranean bloodied by humanitarian wrecks and tragedies, but we can say that political, economic and social relations will increasingly influence borders and migrations themselves, placing the “I” in front of the “other”, thus reversing a millenarian quasi-natural logic pointed out by Harari (2014).

The fear of Ebola, terrorism, unemployment, and criminality allegedly brought by migration will give way to the true expression and sentiment of each individual – or groups of individuals – however much of this confronts the Republican, democratic, Christian and western ideals and discourses of Platine countries.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Throughout this chapter we enumerate the quantitative immigration for the five countries that make up La Plata Basin, namely, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; five states formed by a Spanish-Portuguese colonization of their native nations – from Tupi, Guarani to Incas –, forced migration of African slaves and economic migrations and refuges of Europeans, Arabs, Asians and even other Latin American peoples.

Despite the multicultural character of the Platine societies, recent immigration, called “new groups”, such as Senegalese, Haitian, Bengalis and Malaysians, in addition to the Syrian refugees, were treated differently by the receiving societies, as well as by the public policies of Buenos Aires, Brasília, La Paz, Asunción and Montevideo.

Not only did the cultural-legal scope perceive transformations from new influxes
or new migratory dressing, but also the territory of the Platine countries perceived a deep reconfiguration of national borders and regional transbordering spaces. Platine land borders gained a new economic, institutional, political and military role in relation to the migration boom of the twenty-first century.

Numbers of immigration flows, obtained from official bodies of the five countries studied indicated several subjectivities, hitherto held by common sense and even by academy as exposed untruths or counter-truths. For example, we identified that Brazil received less immigrants than Paraguay and Argentina between 2010 and 2016, while Bolivia was the second country with the largest immigration of Haitians, and Argentina with the largest Senegalese influx.

But these final considerations are not restricted to numerical quantitative of immigration, because it is known that Platine America was and will always be a destination of great migrations, depending on the cycles intrinsic to them and the proper dynamization of globalization and interstate and multi-societal capitalism.

However, the attention is focused directly on globalization dynamism and its repercussions on regional praxis in La Plata Basin, such as the rise of separatist movements, anti-immigration, governmental and contestatory xenophobia, nationalism and supremacist regionalism. These issues, linked by a guiding thread to migration themes and borders, are the real focus of demographers, geographers, internationalists and political scientists, who deserve equal attention from public agents.

La Plata Basin, according to our understanding from reading migratory and territorial dynamics, in a short period of time, presents a giant economic and structural potential within the scope of the “Global South” and South-South relations, movements either dormant or restricted to small groups, under the influence of their peers in the “North”, may threaten regional integration programs, interstate and intra-regional territorial planning, as well as remove the already built character of welcoming migrants and refugees – despite all deficiencies – as an alternative model to great powers that, facing crises nowadays, originate precisely from these nascent feelings in the interim of their societies.

The Platine borders reconfiguration and re-signification can serve as a basis for a new understanding and clarification of recent immigration, especially within the civil society and press, in order to avoid such sentiments and to further promote
the potentialities of the five Platine countries, drivers of a whole regional, cultural, political and historically contestatory development. It is not a matter of rewriting history from new migrations, but of rewriting perception of migrations from history and its lessons.

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